“It’s Shocking!": Analysing the Impact and Reactions to the A3: Android Apps Behaviour Analyser by Hatamian, Majid et al.
“It’s shocking!”: Analysing the Impact and
Reactions to the A3: Android Apps Behaviour
Analyser
Majid Hatamian1?, Agnieszka Kitkowska2, Jana Korunovska3, and Sabrina
Kirrane3
1 Chair of Mobile Business & Multilateral Security, Goethe University Frankfurt,
Frankfurt am Main, Germany,
majid.hatamian.h@ieee.org,
2 Karlstad University, Karlstad, Sweden,
agnieszka.kitkowska@kau.se,
3 Vienna University of Business and Economics, Vienna, Austria,
{sabrina.kirrane, jana.korunovska}@wu.ac.at
Abstract The lack of privacy awareness in smartphone ecosystems pre-
vents users from being able to compare apps in terms of privacy and from
making informed privacy decisions. In this paper we analysed smart-
phone users’ privacy perceptions and concerns based on a novel privacy
enhancing tool called Android Apps Behaviour Analyser (A3). The A3
tool enables user to behaviourally analyse the privacy aspects of their
installed apps and notifies about potential privacy invasive activities. To
examine the capabilities of A3 we designed a user study. We captured
and contrasted privacy concern and perception of 52 participants, before
and after using our tool. The results showed that A3 enables users to
easily detect their smartphone app’s privacy violation activities. Further,
we found that there is a significant difference between users’ privacy con-
cern and expectation before and after using A3 and the majority of them
were surprised to learn how often their installed apps access personal re-
sources. Overall, we observed that the A3 tool was capable to influence
the participants’ attitude towards protecting their privacy.
Keywords: smartphone ecosystems; android; privacy; permission; pri-
vacy concern; privacy behaviour
1 Introduction
In the last decade, the privacy of data users/owners has become a growing con-
cern due to the massive increase in personal information utilised in smartphone
apps [1], social networks [2], outsourced search applications [3, 4], etc.
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Smartphone apps are designed with consideration for the demands and con-
straints of the smartphones and to take advantage of any specialised capabilities
that they have. The smartphone apps market is rapidly growing. In 2017, the
total number of iOS and Android apps available on their marketplace were 2.2
and 3.5 millions, respectively [5]. Furthermore, the number of mobile app down-
loads has grown to 197 billion worldwide in 2017, which is almost 50 billion
more than 2016 [6]. Such enormous number of apps available and the high num-
ber of downloads resulted in increased dependency on apps. In 2017, eMarketer
released a study showing the average amount of time people spent using apps
is two hours, 25 minutes per day [7]. The Techcrunch’s report showed that on
average, smartphone owners used nine apps per day and 30 apps per month.
Accordingly, it was argued that smartphone users rely heavily on apps [8]. For
instance, Marketing Land [9] reported that the smartphone users spent 86% of
their internet usage time using apps. As a result, the landscape of smartphone
use today is very much app-focused. All of these factors make smartphones an
attractive target for privacy invasion.
Each app can request a certain number of permissions which allows it to gain
access to the device resources such as contacts, location, storage, camera, etc.
In older Android versions (prior to version 6.0), users had to grant permissions
requested by each app at the install time and they were not able to restrict those
permissions later. However, with the release of Android 6.0, the users were given
control, and they are able to restrict the requested permissions even at runtime.
Although this feature enables users to better preserve their privacy, prior studies
have shown that few users are aware of it, hence permissions are often ignored
even though they might appear irrelevant to the real functionality of the app [10].
This is due to the fact that many users do not understand the technical and
sometimes ambiguous definitions of permissions [11]. Additionally, most of them
value the use of the apps more than their personal information, despite the fact
that the apps collect large amounts of personal information, for various purposes
ranging from functionality to empower their ads mechanisms [12,13].
The invasive nature of smartphone apps, harvesting personal data has been
demonstrated in many studies. The Wall Street Journal reported a study in
which 101 popular smartphone apps were examined for personal information
gathering activities. Their results showed that more than half of the apps ex-
hibited at least one risky behaviour, such as location tracking, transmission of
a smartphone’s unique device ID number, or the gathering of other personal in-
formation [14]. A report by Appthority showed that 95% of the top 200 free apps
and 80% of the top paid apps for Apple and Android phones did the same [15].
Chia et al. [16] studied risk signaling concerning the privacy intrusiveness of An-
droid apps in two repositories. Their results showed that the number of danger-
ous permissions an app requested was positively correlated with its popularity.
Therefore, the fact that an app is popular does not imply that it respects users’
privacy.
This paper presents the results of interviews and surveys of 52 participants
who used our privacy enhancing tool called Android Apps Behaviour Analyser
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(A3) that is solely designed and implemented for Android devices. In this study,
we examine, compare and contrast smartphone users’ concern and expectation,
by leveraging a user study as a reference point for understanding smartphone-
specific concerns and perceptions. This study is aimed to (1) propose a pri-
vacy enhancing tool for smartphone users to support them for informed privacy
decision-making, (2) test our hypothesis that smartphone users are willing to
take action and change their privacy attitude once they realise how their per-
sonal resources are treated by their installed apps, and (3) provide data over the
understanding of users’ privacy concern and expectation in using smartphone
apps.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the existing
works in the literature related to the privacy concern and expectation analysis
of smartphone users. Section 3 describes the main concepts associated to the
Android Apps Behaviour Analyser (A3) as a novel privacy enhancing tool for
Android users. Section 4 presents the research steps and design decisions taken
in the implemented user study to analyse the impact of A3 on the users’ privacy
concern and expectation and the obtained results are then presented in Section
5. Finally, we conclude the paper and point the future directions of research in
Section 6
2 Related Work
Kelley et al. [17] tried to identify possible causes and incentives for users to will-
ingly share their location with advertisers. The results showed that users were
highly concerned about their personal data. Almost 80% (19 out of 24) of the
people questioned expressed the highest level of concern towards an unsolicited
transfer of personal data gathered about them by a company on a corporate level
(e.g. to other companies, institutions, governments, etc.). The authors concluded
that the users are least concerned when they share information about being at
certain pre-selected locations. The study suggested that this could be attrib-
uted, in part to the fact, that users may like being informed regarding certain
promotion activities or other similar events related to the places specified (e.g.
coupons for favourite restaurants). Differently, Erika et al. [18] studied overall
privacy and security expectations of the users in choosing apps. They first sur-
veyed 60 smartphone users to measure their willingness to perform certain tasks
using their smartphones to test the hypothesis that people currently avoid using
their phones due to privacy and security concerns. Second, they investigated
why and how the users trust a certain app. The results showed that users are
more concerned and conservative about privacy on their smartphones than their
laptops. The authors also identified the threats which scare smartphone users
of using smartphones (e.g. malicious apps, data loss, etc.). Based on these res-
ults, they suggested some recommendations to ameliorate privacy and security
confidence of users to increase trust in choosing apps. A different user-centric
study was published by Felt et al. [19]. They presented a risk ranking of sensitive
smartphone resources by user concerns. A successive open-end enquiry among
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a group of 42 participants gathered personal descriptions and ratings of a sub-
set of evaluated risks which disclosed that the lowest-ranked risks are seen as
disturbances, the highest-ranked risks however represent serious issues. They
found that warnings in Android and iOS do not satisfy users’ concerns. They
concluded that future permission systems should consider user concerns when
deciding which permissions are protected with warnings.
Lin et al. [10] investigated privacy expectations of smartphone users. The
main goal of the authors was to figure out when an app violates users’ expect-
ations. Having considering this and by arguing that if a user’s mental model
aligns with what the app actually does, the authors claimed there would be
fewer privacy issues since the user is adequately informed of the actual app’s
behaviour. This brought them to the point of allowing users to see the most
common misexpectations about an app by revising users’ mental model. For
this reason, they suggested the use of both crowdsourcing users’ mental mod-
els and profiling mobile apps using log analysis tools. Amini et al. [20] employed
crowdsourcing as part of a procedure to analyse mobile apps privacy expectation.
Participants were asked to rate their expectation and comfort feeling according
to the access of sensitive information related to the identified tasks. Thus, by
considering the context of apps as well as privacy invasive behaviour, an assess-
ment of the desirability of this information leakage can be depicted. Continuing
this work, Amini et al. [21] envision the tool AppScanner, consisting of different
sub-modules, to be able to evaluate mobile apps privacy on a large scale. Enhan-
cing the work presented before, crowdsourcing still presents a main component
for gathering user’s expectation related to the privacy behaviour of apps. The
analysis of the past research lead to the following research questions:
RQ-1: What are people’s privacy expectations of mobile apps?
RQ-2: Do people have correct mental models of mobile apps resource access
behaviour?
RQ-3: Are privacy concerns and trust correlated with people’s expectations?
In [22], the authors studied the compliance of accessing permissions by in-
stalled apps with regard to the users’ expectation. To this end, they modified the
Android OS to log whenever an installed app accessed a permission-protected re-
source and then gave modified smartphones to 36 participants who used them as
their primary phones for one week. Afterwards, they showed various instances
over the past week where apps had accessed certain types of data and asked
whether those instances were expected, and whether they would have wanted to
deny access. The results showed that 80% of the participants would have pre-
ferred to prevent at least one permission request, and overall, they stated a desire
to block over a third of all requests. This is an important work that revealed the
discrepancy between users’ expectation and actual app behaviour. One of the
most relevant outcomes from their work is identification of the need of transpar-
ency with regard to which app accesses which resources and at what frequency.
A study from 2017 by Crager et al. [23] considered a different type of threat for
users’ privacy that comes from smartphones’ sensors and other wearables. One
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specific threat that they presented was from an advertising software developer
kit (SDK), that used the smartphone’s microphone to listen the near-ultrasonic
sounds placed in the TV, radio and Web ads, which could be eventually used
to infer the user’s preferences. The results showed that users were only aware
of the location tracking, and had not been considering the other three, namely
Device-Fingerprinting, Keystroke-Monitoring and Acoustic Eavesdropping. As
expected, users learning about the threats were immediately concerned about
their privacy. The authors concluded that more efforts should be put into educat-
ing trivial (not experienced) users about the possible threats, but acknowledged
the fact that the users would generally avoid using an app or a device if its
security system affects usability.
Having included related work from 2011 to 2017, we conclude that although
people are concerned, they are not in fact, fully aware how their data is being
treated and how this affects their privacy. The part we shall be more concerned
about is that the users, even after being alerted, tend not to change their beha-
viour (attitude) and instead try to rationalise using privacy-violating apps and
willingly ignoring or accepting the possible risks. This behaviour, was coined in
the literature as privacy paradox meaning that people’s attitude toward privacy
does not align with their actual behaviour [24,25]. This phenomenon is frequently
assigned to psychological biases and heuristics that accompanies decision-making
process. In the digital context the privacy paradox could be diminished by the
reduction of information asymmetry. Currently, the end-users are not provided
with a sufficient and understandable information about the data collection pro-
cesses, unlike the service providers who have all the information about their
data collection practice. Due to the lack of information, users are trapped in the
bounded rationality, where the rational maximisation of benefits is restricted due
to the limits of cognitive abilities [26].
Unlike the mentioned studies, we aim to increase the smartphone users aware-
ness of privacy. By proposing a transparency tool called Android Apps Behaviour
Analyser (A3) we analyse the behaviour of installed apps on the user’s smart-
phone to identify privacy deviated activities. Out tool does not rely on the
existing reviewed techniques for log analysis that require modification the OS
(or root access). Additionally, we perform a user study to examine the users’
privacy concern and expectation after revealing how much and to which level
their personal information is accessed with/without their awareness. Hence, our
remaining research questions are:
RQ-4: Is A3 tool capable of increasing mobile privacy awareness and altering
privacy concerns?
RQ-5: What are people’s reactions for the A3 tool and to the information
it provides?
3 Technical Implementation: The A3 Tool
This section elaborates on the technical implementation followed in this paper to
develop the A3 tool including its respective components. Fig. 1 shows a high level
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Fig. 1. A high level overview of the A3 tool.
architecture of A3. As it can be seen, A3 has several components. In principle,
the log reader component is responsible to read device’s logs, and accordingly,
produce the raw data. These data are then sent to the data mining component
which aims to analyse the apps’ privacy behaviour. The results obtained from
the data mining component are then sent to the user for further evaluation and
decision.
3.1 Log Reader Component
Throughout the implementation phase, we consistently target three main goals.
Firstly, A3 must work without any need for root access to the OS. Secondly, there
must not be any modification to the core of the OS. Lastly, it should be capable of
being installed on the recent versions of Android. We implemented the log reader
based on AppOps which is a privacy manager tool and introduced in Android
4.3. However, Google decided to make it hidden in later versions of Android
and it is currently inaccessible, unless the device is rooted [27]. To the best of
our knowledge, root access is only necessary to access the AppOps management
system, e.g. to tell the system to deny access to one of the operations that is
controlled by AppOps. We found that to view the AppOps logs, there is no
need to root the device, and they are accessible to any app with debugging
privileges [28, 29]. Generally, in order to collect the logs, a timer is sent to the
PermissionUsageLogger service periodically. When it is received, the logger
queries the AppOps service that is already running on the phone for a list of
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apps that have used any of the operations we are interested in tracking. We then
check through that list and for any app that has used an operation more recently
than we have checked, we store the time at which that operation was used in our
own internal log. These timestamps can then be counted to get a usage count.
3.2 Data Mining Component
This component is supposed to behaviourally analyse the installed apps by get-
ting help from the results obtained from the log reader component. This is done
according to a rule-based approach which is supposed to increase the functional-
ity and flexibility of our data mining component. Consequently, we have defined
a set of privacy deviated behaviour detection rules that are aimed to analyse the
privacy behaviour of the users’ installed apps. We initially defined a set of sens-
itive permissions (introduced by Android4) and we mainly analyse the accesses
to these resources. For example, consider the device’s screen is off and it is in
the horizontal orientation (and the user does not talk on the phone, meaning
that the AUDIO permission is not being used). In such situation, we assume that
the user does not use the phone (e.g. the phone lies on the desk) and if one of
the sensitive resources is accessed by a given installed app, we record this and
report to the user about the detail of the access (date, time and reason together
with a short explanation). Therefore, the users can transparently manage their
resource accesses (due to space limitations, we refrained from explaining all the
defined rules).
3.3 Graphical User Interface
The A3 tool informs users of the potential misuses of their personal data. For
this reason, we emphasise how the privacy indicators are shown to the user.
Therefore, the Graphical User Interface (GUI) plays a crucial role in A3. The
GUI offers the following functionality:
App selection In order to follow the principle of data minimisation [30], the users
are given this option to choose the apps that they are interested to analyse their
privacy behaviour, meaning that the users can freely choose which app(s) should
be scanned (Fig. 2(a)).
Scan intervals We have given users the ability to decide about the desired scan
intervals, meaning that they can determine the watchdog intervals at which the
sensitive resources are scanned for any potential privacy invasive activity (Fig.
2(b)).
Permission restriction As Google has initiated a new permission manager system
in Android 6.0 and later versions, we have embedded a direct access to this
permission manager system to revoke/grant permissions for any app (Fig. 2(c)).
4 https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/requesting.html
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(a) (d)(c)(b)
Fig. 2. A3 user interface (a) app selection (b) scan intervals (c) permission
restriction, and (d) behaviour analysis.
Behaviour analysis The users are able to check which personal resources (per-
missions) have been accessed by their installed apps. They can also observe the
time and frequency of accesses. Accordingly, a synopsis of apps and resources
accessed including the corresponding timestamps are communicated to the user.
This also entailed to translate the technical terms of permissions defined by An-
droid (e.g. PHONE_STATE, COARSE_LOCATION, etc.) to understandable definitions
for the ordinary users (Fig. 2(d)).
4 The Design of the User Study
The user study comprises four main phases, including, recruitment, enter survey,
a one week apps’ behaviour analysis, and exit survey. In order to link enter
and exit surveys, we supplied participants with an anonymous personal code.
We asked participants about their privacy concerns, attitudes and expectations
of the personal information that their smartphone would collect and transfer
before and after using A3. The results gathered from this user study provide us
with a sound foundation to compare the users expectations with actual results
obtained from A3. This helps and supports users to judge to which extent their
expectations match what the apps are doing in the reality. In the following, each
phase is described in detail.
4.1 Recruitment
In total, 52 participants were recruited through placing an online recruitment
advertisement on social networks (e.g. Facebook) within a three month time
period (Nov 2017 to Jan 2018). In order to participate in the user study, the
participants were asked to read and sign a consent form in which they stated
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that they are over 18 years old and they own Android smartphones. To reduce
potential biases, we requested for participants without advanced knowledge in
computer science and IT related areas.
4.2 Enter Survey
In this phase, the participants were given certain questions about their: (1) pri-
vacy concern and (2) expectation of the smartphone apps behaviour. We tried
to reuse the questions from [10, 18, 31, 32] and adapted them to our application
domain. The majority of the survey used Likert [33] like item scales to measure
the privacy concern and expectation of the participants in the area of smart-
phones. The scores ranged from one extreme attitude (not at all concerned) to
another (extremely concerned). In the first set of questions, we collected data on
participant demographics, privacy concern and expectation. In the demograph-
ics section, we asked participants to provide information on their demographic
background, such as their age and gender. We then investigated participants’ pri-
vacy concern when using a smartphone app in different scenarios such as when
the information they shared was considered sensitive in general, or when an app
accessed information that did not seem as relevant. Lastly, we collected data on
participants’ expectation of what information they believed had been accessed
by different kinds of apps.
4.3 Apps Privacy Behaviour: A One Week Analysis
After the successful completion of the enter survey, the participants gave us the
permission to install A3 on their smartphones and they agreed to keep it running
for one week. In order to make sure whether this one week time period is rep-
resentative enough, we purchased ten Android smartphones and we installed the
A3 tool on them. We then let A3 to run in the background for two weeks while
it was scanning each individual phone (during this period, we never interacted
with the devices, ensuring that they have sufficient battery level). We found that
after almost one week, it is possible to observe a significant number of permission
(resource) accesses by installed apps which would give us an indicator/under-
standing about the apps’ behaviour. That is why we decided to choose the one
week time slot. During the one-week interval, participants launched A3 on their
smartphones and performed their usual daily activities with their phones while
the tool was scanning all the resource accesses by their installed apps. It is worth
to mention that we did not collect any personal information and all the scan res-
ults remained on the users’ phones (the analysis results were not transmitted to
external parties, servers, etc.).
4.4 Exit Survey
At the end of the week, the participants returned to our lab. They were presented
with the results of the analysis of their installed apps’ behaviour and completed
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Table 1: Participants demographics.
Demographic Group N %
Age 18-24 16 30.8
25-34 25 48.1
35-44 7 13.5
45 or older 4 7.7
Gender Female 22 42.3
Male 30 57.7
Education High school 4 7.7
Some college 4 7.7
Bachelors degree 30 57.7
Masters degree or higher 14 26.9
IT experience Not at all 21 40.4
Trivial 20 38.5
Moderate 9 17.3
A lot 2 3.8
the exit survey. We asked the participants to go through the results of the scans
to see how their personal resources have been treated by their installed apps
during the one week period. The questions in the exit survey examined how
participants’ expectation changed as a result of using A3, e.g. whether they
changed their privacy attitude, do they have the intention/willingness to change
their behaviour, what do they think about A3, whether its results are inform-
ative, annoying, expected, etc. Finally, each participant was compensated by a
€15 Amazon voucher.
5 Results
5.1 General Exploration over the Data
Among 52 study participants, the majority (48.1%) were between 25-34 years
old. The sample was almost equally distributed among two genders, females
(42.3%) and males (57.7%). Most of the respondents held higher education,
either bachelor’s (57.7%) or master’s degree and higher (26.6%). The detailed
demographics are presented in Table 1.
Only three (5.7%) participants admitted that they read privacy policy before
installing the new smartphone app, while 17 (32.7%) said they never read it, 23
(44.2%) said they read it rarely, and nine (17.3%) sometimes. The majority of
respondents expressed their lack of knowledge about privacy in general (N = 31,
59.6%). Most of them were certain (N = 23, 32.7%) or not sure (N = 16,
30.8%) whether they have a basic knowledge about technical terms of privacy
and security.
The participants admitted that they prefer social media and convenience to
privacy and security. 16 (30.8%) said it is very true and 16 (30.8%) said rather
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true. Additionally, 33 (63.5%) participants confessed that they actively use social
media.
Regardless, most participants stated that they feel motivated, and spend
considerable time trying to protect their online privacy (N = 32, 61.5%). 29
(55.8%) respondents did not feel confident that somebody could track or monitor
their online activities, and 15 (28.8%) were not sure how they feel about it.
5.2 User Expectation
In the enter survey we asked participants about their expectations of apps be-
haviour (RQ-1). First, we wanted to know how likely they think the app which
they did not create an account for, will have access to sensitive information (i.e.
location, contacts, etc.). The majority of participants said that it is not likely
(N = 22, 42.3%) or only slightly likely (N = 12, 23.1%). The small percentage
of respondents thought it is moderately (N = 10, 19.2%), or very and extremely
likely (N = 8, 15.3%). Additionally, we asked to what extent the respondents
agree with the following statement Smartphone apps are only accessing resources
and permissions which are related to their functionality (e.g. navigation apps
need to have access to your location etc.). In total 20 participants strongly or
somewhat agreed with the statement (38.4%), and 13 (25%) were neutral about
it.
We wanted to examine whether participants would like to know more about
the data collection and processing of smartphone apps. First, we asked if they
would like to know what personal information is accessed by apps installed on
their smartphones. The majority of participants strongly agreed (N = 36, 69.2%)
or somewhat agreed (N = 10, 19.2%) with such statement. Additionally, we
asked whether they would like to know how their personal information is used
by apps installed on their phones. Once again, the participants even strongly
agreed (N = 39, 75%) or somewhat agreed (N = 9, 17.3%) that they wish to
know it.
5.3 App Resource Access Behaviour
We were interested to identify whether participants have the correct mental
model for the frequency of access to the phone resources of certain app types
(RQ-2). Therefore, in the enter survey we asked participants whether they have
a social network, messaging and navigation app installed (most common sensible
app categories to ordinary users), and if so, how many times such app is access-
ing their phone’s location, storage, contacts, accounts, phone number, audio,
calendar, camera and SMS/MMS. To see whether the assumptions were close to
reality, in the exit survey we asked respondents to provide the access information
from the A3 tool, collected over the week.
In general, respondents underestimated the frequency of resource access by
different apps. Among the respondents who had social network app on their
phones (N = 34), 48.1% underestimated the location access, 59.6% storage,
30.8% contacts while 38.8% overestimated camera access. Similarly, the owners
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of messaging apps (N = 46) underestimated the numbers of access to location
(N = 20, 30.8%), storage (N = 43, 88.5%), contacts (N = 34, 65.4%), accounts
(N = 33, 63.5%), audio (N = 28, 53.8%), camera (N = 21, 40.4%). Lastly, the
respondents highly underestimated the navigation apps resource access, such as
location (N = 41, 78.7%) and storage (N = 44, 84.6%). We found that the real
frequencies of apps accessing various resources vary, and where really high, some
of them reaching over 40000 times per day.
5.4 Privacy Concern Aspects in Smartphone Apps
General Privacy Concerns and Trust We developed a Likert scale [33] to
investigate privacy concerns and online trust. We checked the reliability, and
Cronbach α was .848 for the five trust items, and .754 for the five privacy con-
cerns items. The Cronbach alpha is a reliability test that should be applied
to check whether the scale is consistent, and whether it measures the desired
attitude. It is based on the calculation of the average value of the reliability
coefficients of all available items when divided into two half-tests [34].
We applied Spearman test for correlations to investigate whether there are
relationships between privacy concerns, trust and expectations (RQ-3). The
Spearman correlation was used because the data did not meet the assumptions
of parametric tests. Spearman correlation is used on the ranked data, and it
measures the strength of the relationship between two variables [35]. We found
significant correlations between trust and the role of an app reputation when
deciding upon personal information disclosure (rs = .35, p < .05). There was a
positive correlation between trust and a belief that an app accesses only resources
related to its functionality (rs = .49, p < .001). Additionally, we found a negative
correlation between trust and refusal of providing personal data to smartphone
apps (rs = −.41, p < .05), apps’ access to sensitive information (rs = −.30,
p < .05) and the restrictions of applications’ permissions (rs = −.40, p < .05).
Further, we found a significant correlation between privacy concerns and
willingness to uninstall the app, if it violates users’ privacy (rs = .38, p < .05).
Lastly, there was a correlation between concerns and fear about the safety of
information (rs = .30, p < .05).
We used Spearman test for correlations to examine whether people with
higher levels of privacy concerns rank higher the importance of clear information
about app’s access to different types of personal information (when deciding on
app’s download or usage). We identified positive correlations between privacy
concerns and importance of information about access to the phone’s location,
storage, contacts, accounts, audio, and camera (Table 2).
Privacy Issues in Smartphone Apps One of the research goals was to in-
vestigate whether the A3 tool is capable of increasing smartphone users’ privacy
awareness (RQ-4). To examine this we used repetitive measures, pre- and post
questionnaires asking participants about their privacy concerns in the context
of smart-phone apps. We applied Wilcoxon test to measure whether the par-
ticipants’ level of privacy concern changed after using A3. We used Wilcoxon
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Table 2: Spearman correlations: privacy concerns and importance of clear
information about the apps access to different types of personal information.
Information type Correlation Sig. (2-tailed)
Location .494 .000
Storage .335 .015
Contacts .362 .008
Accounts .522 .000
Audio .386 .005
Camera .508 .000
test because we it is suitable for ordinal, ranked data. This test enables a dir-
ect comparison in related design studies, between participant’s scores in two
conditions [36].
The test indicated that in the exit survey, participants scored significantly
higher on concerns about personal data being leaked or transferred to third
parties (Z = −5.106, p < .001). Similarly their concerns were significantly higher
about data falsification (Z = −4.088, p < .001), online bullying and flaming
(Z = −3.7006, p < .001), receiving spam emails (Z = −5.056, p < .001), and
receiving behavioural adds (Z = −4.080, p < .001). Further, after a week of using
A3 participants were more worried about government surveillance (Z = −4.375,
p < .001) and about apps accessing irrelevant information (Z = 5.442, p < .001).
However, there was no significant difference in before and after scores regarding
the level of concern about their credit card being used by others.
5.5 Reaction to the Transparency Tool
Overall, we were interested in how the participants react to the A3 tool, and to
the information it has provided (RQ-5). After using the A3 tool for a week, the
majority of respondents were surprised to learn how often apps access their per-
sonal resources (N = 46, 88.5%). The respondents found information provided
by A3 shocking (N = 40, 76.9%) but informative (N = 36, 69.3%). The parti-
cipants realised that some apps access permissions that are not related to their
functionality (N = 49, 94.3%), and they were shocked about it (N = 46, 88.4%).
In regards of privacy intentions and concerns, participants expressed the will-
ingness to restrict apps permissions in the future (N = 46, 88.5%), as well as
uninstalling some of the apps that they find privacy invasive (N = 40, 86.9%).
The majority (N = 46, 88.5%) found themselves more worried about privacy
than before using A3, and they intend to report privacy invasive behaviours
(N = 32, 61.6%), e.g. in the form of user comment on the Google Play Store to
increase the privacy awareness of other users. Similarly, they expressed a willing-
ness to read privacy policies before installing the app (N = 36, 69.3%). Lastly,
the respondents admitted they would like to have tool like A3 earlier (N = 47,
90.4%) and if possible wish to use it to monitor their smartphone apps behaviour
(N = 43, 82.7%).
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Table 3: Spearman correlations: privacy concerns and trust with information
sensitivity.
Sensitive information Correlation Sig.(2-tailed)
Privacy Concerns Location .286 .040
Storage .417 .002
Accounts .277 .047
Audio .326 .018
Calendar .327 .018
Trust Contacts -.277 .047
Calendar -.346 .012
SMS/MMS -.276 .047
5.6 Additional Findings
Privacy Sensitivity Degree of Different Smartphone Resources We
asked respondents about the sensitivity of different types of information, on a
scale from Not at all sensitive to Extremely sensitive. The participants perceived
as extremely sensitive storage information (photos & videos)(N = 20, 38.5%),
audio (N = 15, 28.5%), camera (N = 17, 32.7%). They perceived as a not at
all sensitive calendar information (N = 16, 30.8%) and SMS/MMS (N = 13,
25%). The other information types were scored as moderately (accounts on your
phone, phone number) or slightly (location, contacts) sensitive.
The Spearman correlation tests identified significant positive correlations
between the information sensitivity and privacy concerns. There was a weak
correlation between concerns and sensitivity of location and accounts. Addition-
ally, sensitive information about the storage, audio and calendar was correlated
with concerns. Further, we found that there is a significant negative correla-
tion between trust and sensitivity level of contacts, calendar and SMS/MMS
information. The results of correlation analysis are presented in Table 3.
5.7 Discussion
Our findings confirm that A3 is able to affect the way by which people are
concerned about their privacy. Although the majority of the participants (65.4%)
said it is not likely or slightly likely that an app which they did not create an
account for, will have an access to sensitive resources, the participants realised it
is incorrect. They reported a higher number of apps that were not being used by
them during the one week analysis, but still they were accessing users’ personal
resources in a very aggressive manner (without any user interaction, e.g. account
creation, etc.). Further, 38.4% of the participants believed that smartphone apps
only access resources relevant to their functionality (e.g. a weather forecasting
app requires access to location). However, we discovered that some apps (e.g.
health & fitness, navigation, etc.) that do not need to excessively request or
access privacy sensitive information, are doing so without users’ knowledge.
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Overall, the information provided by A3 raised the participants’ privacy
awareness after a trial period. This indicates that the reduction of information
asymmetry by providing users with information about the apps resource ac-
cess, may help to overcome or at least reduce the privacy paradox. However,
this requires further investigation in different experimental settings enabling ex-
amination of causal relationship between the attitude and behaviour prior and
after using the A3 tool. Additionally, our results demonstrated that users have
an inaccurate mental model of apps’ resource access behaviour, and they mostly
underestimated the frequency of permission accesses by their installed apps.
However, the participants expressed willingness to change their attitude and be-
havior after using the tool. This willingness to change suggests that the tool such
as A3 could adjust users mental models, raising privacy awareness and enabling
informed privacy decision-making.
5.8 Limitations
The scope of this paper comprises Android OS. Regardless of the choice of the
research area, currently the A3 tool cannot be applied to other smartphone
platforms (e.g. iOS). Another limitation is the low number of participants (52
people) due to the complexity of the study. This happened due to several reasons.
Firstly, A3 is solely executable on Android devices, correspondingly, we missed
lots of participants who showed interest but they were not technically qualified
to participate in the study (e.g. iOS users). Secondly, since A3 is not publicly
available on the Google Play Store, several interested people expressed that they
do not feel comfortable to install an app from unknown sources on their phones.
Further, we tried our best to keep the study safe from any biases (e.g. to not
focus on privacy experts). Unfortunately, in such studies, it is challenging to
have a diverse type of participants which would further enhance the validity of
our analysis.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the smartphone users’ privacy awareness by conduct-
ing a user study based on an implemented privacy enhancing tool (A3 ). We
examined the applicability of such tool with the real users and investigated the
users’ reaction to A3. Thus, we performed a user study comprising of 52 parti-
cipants and we analysed their privacy concern and expectation before and after
using the A3 tool. The results clearly showed that users’ privacy concern and
expectation changed after using A3. We identified that users’ privacy aware-
ness increased due to the implication of A3. Moreover, we observed that users
mostly have poor knowledge of how their installed apps treat their personal
sensitive resources. Additionally, we found that there is a gap between what
smartphone users perceive about privacy and what is happening in the reality
by their installed apps. Study participants were shocked once they understood
how their apps are accessing their resources without their knowledge, especially
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when accessing resources that are not necessary for the appropriate functionality
of an app. As a result, we believe that the smartphone users need such privacy
enhancing tool to better protect their privacy and to make informed privacy
decisions. Although the results showed the changed perceptions of privacy issues
that might be due to the use of A3, for the future work we plan to implement
an explanatory study investigating the role of A3 tool in the causal relationship
of privacy attitude-behaviour change. This will enable us to contrast the control
group with the experimental group for a more confident comparative analysis.
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